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Abstract
This paper explores, theoretically and empirically, how governments may use
the tradeoff between social and military expenditure to advance their electoral
and partisan objectives. Three key results emerge. First, governments tend to
bias outlays towards social expenditure and away from military expenditure at
election times. Second, the size of this tradeoff is larger when we exclude coun-
tries involved in conflict, where national security plays an important role on voter
choice. Third, while certain categories of social expenditure are higher during left
administrations, military expenditure is higher during right administrations.
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1 Introduction
Politicians, when in office, have strong incentives to choose policies that will maximise
their re-election prospects and promote their partisan agenda. The influence of gov-
ernment incentives on policy choices has been explored by the political cycle theories.
The opportunistic (or electoralist) theories argue that all governments, regardless of
ideological orientation, will manipulate economic policies around elections to raise their
chances of being re-elected. The partisan theories claim that left-wing governments will
engage in more income re-distribution and more expansionary policies than right-wing
governments during their time in office. Opportunism and partisanship are often per-
ceived as competing arguments and studied separately in the literature. Furthermore,
despite the voluminous empirical studies, the evidence regarding which policy tools are
actually preferred by governments for meeting their political aims is still inconclusive.
Our paper contributes to this literature by providing a theoretical framework and empir-
ical evidence on the role of social and military expenditure in generating political cycles,
when politicians are motivated by both opportunistic and partisan considerations. The
interactive relationship between the two types of expenditure has been extensively dis-
cussed in studies considering the economic implications of military spending, but has
never been systematically analysed within a political cycle framework.
Why should we expect political cycles to differ in timing and direction across social
and military expenditure? A strong motivation can be found in a line of research ar-
guing that the government faces a tradeoff between “butter” and “guns”: if it devotes
more resources to military activities without increasing the total budget, civilian sectors
of the economy must pay by foregoing benefits they would otherwise receive, and vice
versa (Russett, 1982). Since expenses for social programs have a more direct and more
immediate political influence on voters during peace time than do military expenditure,
increased allocations to “butter” in election years can partly occur at the expense of
“guns” (Mintz, 1988). Central to “butter-vs-guns” thesis is also the role of government
ideology in shaping budget priorities. Following the partisan theory claims, we would
expect that left-wing governments will spend more than right-wing governments. How-
ever, given that right-wing parties tend to be more pro-military and in favour of a strong
national defence (Klingemann et al., 1994; Whitten & Williams, 2011), we should also
expect ideology to have the opposite effect on military spending.
Rogoff (1990) was the first to predict that electoral cycles can take the form of
changes in the composition (rather than the level) of government spending. According
to his model, each politician has a competence level, which is considered to be private
information, and voters use the part of government spending they observe to make in-
ferences about post-electoral competence. As a result, the incumbent tries to signal his
competence before the election by shifting government outlays towards the more “visi-
ble” public goods and away from investment. Following the competence argument, Shi
& Svensson (2006) show that electoral cycles can emerge even if most voters observe all
government expenses, as long as some voters are uninformed. Thus, electoral cycles are
more likely in developing countries (Shi & Svensson, 2006) or in “young democracies”
(Brender & Drazen, 2005), due to lower access to free media or lack of familiarity with
electoral politics. In a recent study, Drazen & Eslava (2010) support the existence of
election-year fiscal manipulation in countries with sophisticated, well-informed voters,
who are averse to high overall government spending. According to their model, citizens
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value government spending on some goods but not others, and rational, forward looking
voters use the composition of public expenditure to make inferences about the incum-
bent’s preferences. Electoral manipulation thus takes the form of shifting spending
towards the goods voters prefer in the attempt to convince them that the incumbent
shares their spending priorities.
In this paper, we build a theoretical model to analyse how governments use the
tradeoff between “butter” and “guns” as a means of advancing their electoral and
partisan objectives. As in Drazen & Eslava (2010), the model relies on information
asymmetries regarding how much politicians care about voters’ utility, and focuses on a
society with rational and forward-looking voters, who observe all government expenses;
that is, the case of developed established democracies. Unlike the existing literature,
the model rationalises the role of social and military expenditure in generating electoral
compositional budget cycles and identifies the factors that shape the tradeoff between
the two types of expenditure. It also shows that these electoral cycles can emerge in
an environment in which governments have also partisan motivations. In particular, we
argue that in all democratic countries voters tend to favour welfare spending (such as,
old age, housing and health programs) and reward incumbents with the same spending
choices. In addition, they assign low priority to military spending, as they consider
it to be less important in periods of peace.1 Politicians, on the other hand, differ
in the value they assign to the two types of spending (which cannot be observed by
voters), and, regardless of ideology, they all prefer to spend more on the military and
less on social programs compared to voters. The latter is consistent with the argument
that national defence is perceived by politicians as a general measure of status and
prestige.2 Voters cannot (ex ante) distinguish between politicians who manipulate the
budget composition to attract votes and those whose spending preferences are consistent
with what voters want. Hence, they form expectations regarding the type of politician
(and thus the post-electoral spending) by observing the pre-electoral allocation to the
two goods. Before the election, an incumbent politician will shift the composition of
spending towards social welfare and away from defence to signal that his preferences
are close to those of voters, which, in turn, will produce an electoral compositional
budget cycle. The size of this cycle in our model changes when countries are involved in
conflicts. In such economies, voters assign a relatively higher value to military spending
due to security considerations, and their spending priorities become more aligned with
those of politicians. As a result, a butter-vs-guns tradeoff becomes a less effective signal
of the politician’s type and the electoral cycle is now less pronounced. Finally, according
to our model, politicians’ spending decisions are also influenced by their ideological
positions: left-wing governments tend to favour generous welfare policies and dovish
foreign policies, whereas right-wing governments tend to favour austere welfare policies
1Wlezien (1996) shows that voters respond rather quickly to defence appropriations decisions and
that policymakers respond directly to public preferences for defence spending and adjust its appropri-
ations accordingly.
2Scholars of international relations almost unanimously agree that leaders are very concerned about
the reputation and status of their state (see, for example, Snyder & Diesing, 1977; McMahon, 1991;
Mercer, 2010; Dafoe et al., 2014). Although the main factor determining a country’s military expen-
diture is what it can afford, “status and prestige are certainly important and to be a proper state
is thought to require armed forces” (Smith, 2009, p. 97). Ambition is a main motive for increasing
military spending, as leaders are inherently ambitious and their forward-looking foreign policies require
high investment in military spending (Castillo et al., 2001).
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and hawkish foreign policies. This leads to the appearance of partisan cycles in the
two types of expenditure, which can coincide with the compositional budget cycle of
electoral-calendar timing.
We then test the main predictions of the theoretical model. Using data from a panel
of 22 OECD countries from 1988 to 2009, we provide robust empirical evidence in line
with these predictions. Our findings can be summarised as follows. First, governments
tend to bias outlays towards social expenditure and away from military expenditure
at election times, lending support to a “butter-vs-guns” tradeoff within an electoral
competition setting. Second, these effects become more pronounced when we exclude
the countries with increased conflict involvement, where national security can play an
important role on voter choice. Third, partisan distinctions are clearly discernible
but differ between the two types of expenditure: while certain categories of social
expenditure are higher during left administrations, military expenditure is higher during
right administrations. These findings can explain why studies that treat electoral effects
as symmetric across different expenditure categories and different countries, and fail to
appreciate that political ideology has different dimensions, may find weak empirical
support for the existence of political cycles.
Our paper has also important contributions to the empirical literature of politi-
cal cycles in OECD countries. Prior empirical studies on this topic concentrate their
analysis on the influence of government ideology and do not investigate electoral cycles
(Potrafke, 2009, 2011), or focus on the detection of partisan and electoral effects in
the overall level of social expenditure (Herwartz & Theilen, 2014). Furthermore, ex-
isting political cycle studies looking at compositional budget changes either ignore the
impacts on military spending or employ the same empirical specification for all types
of expenditure. Failure to control for important determinants of a country’s military
burden (such as, international threats, military interventions, the presence of an arms
race, conflicts, alliances) is a serious concern when studying the influence of politics
on military spending, as it leads to omitted variable bias. Our paper addresses these
issues using the most recent data on social and military expenditure, a rich set of con-
trol variables, and the most recently developed econometric techniques. Moreover, it
contributes to the literature on the interaction effects of globalization and government
ideology. Recent empirical evidence points to the conclusion that the partisan influence
on social expenditure in OECD countries has decreased over the past three decades,
and several authors relate this finding to the effects of globalization.3 Our results show
that, while ideology has indeed lost some of its influence on the overall level of social
spending, it has become more important for certain social policy areas. This suggests
that globalization does not eliminate partisan cycles; it only directs politicians effort
towards certain social policy programs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly related studies; Section 3
presents our theoretical framework; Section 4 describes the data on social and military
expenditure; Section 5 outlines the empirical model specification; Section 6 reports the
empirical results and investigates their robustness; Section 7 concludes.
3For a detailed discussion of the literature on the interaction effects of globalization and government
ideology, see Dreher et al. (2008) and Meinhard & Potrafke (2012).
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2 Background
Rogoff (1990)’s electoral compositional budget cycle predicts that electoral incentives
may induce the incumbent to shift public spending towards “visible” government cur-
rent consumption and away from capital investment goods. A number of studies lend
empirical support to this prediction using either multi-county panel data (Schuknecht,
2000; Vergne, 2009; Katsimi & Sarantides, 2012) or data for local government elections
(Schneider, 2010; Veiga & Veiga, 2007). However, whether elections give rise to a sub-
stitution of capital for current expenditure or the opposite is still debatable. Katsimi
& Sarantides (2012) point out that this can be attributed to different perceptions of
which categories of public spending are actually “more visible”. A common feature
of the aforementioned studies is that they focus on specific categories of non-defence
spending and fail to appreciate that military expenditure (which cannot be charac-
terised by “low visibility”) may also be sacrificed around elections as one way to enable
increases in civilian expenditure. The tradeoff between “butter” and “guns” is very well
established in the literature on the economic implications of military spending (Whitten
& Williams, 2011) and the causes of civil conflict (Caruso, 2010), but has never been
systematically analysed within an electoral competition setting.4
In a recent study, Efthyvoulou (2012) shows that the size of electoral fiscal cycles is
negatively correlated with non-economic voting: the higher the level of non-economic
voting, the weaker are politicians’ incentives to manipulate fiscal policy as fewer voters
can be influenced by an electoral boom in targeted welfare expenditures. This may also
imply that in countries where non-economic matters are high on the public’s political
agenda, politicians may choose to pursue an appropriate set of non-economic policies
to signal that their concerns are close to those of voters. While most categories of gov-
ernment spending are directly linked to redistributive policies, such as unemployment
and old age benefits, defence spending is highly associated with non-economic priorities.
This suggests that the extent to which politicians make “butter-vs-guns” tradeoffs may
vary across countries and that the magnitude of the resulting effects may be determined
by election politics and external security concerns.
A related literature focuses on the influence of electoral accountability on the likeli-
hood of war. On the one hand, Hess & Orphanides (1995, 2001) argue that an incumbent
with low performance in handling the domestic economy has incentives to wage a con-
flict so as to display war leadership capabilities and increase the odds of re-election.
In a similar vein, Conconi et al. (2014) find that democratic dyads, in which one or
both leaders are subject to binding term limits, are involved in armed conflicts as often
as autocratic or mixed dyads. Interestingly, they also find that conflicts are less likely
to occur during the first mandate. On the other hand, democratic peace theory has
long argued that democratic incumbents avoid costly interstate conflicts; for example,
due to their desire to be re-elected by conflict-averse public (see, for example, Russett
4The available empirical studies on electoral defence spending cycles are solely based on single-
country evidence and do not reach conclusive results: Nincic & Cusack (1979) show that the US
military spending rises during the two years preceding the elections; Dalen & Swank (1996) show that
the Dutch defence spending increases in election years; Mintz (1988) finds that the Israeli compensation
of employees in the military sector is smaller in the year prior to elections (but no evidence of electoral
effects in programs such as the procurement of weapons); and, Zuk & Woodbury (1986) and Karago¨l
& Turhan (2008) fail to find any trace of electoral cycles in military expenditure in the United States
and Turkey, respectively.
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& Oneal, 2001). In fact, whereas there are political gains at the domestic level from
negotiating a resolution to difficult international issues (Morrow, 1991), the potential
target states may strategically avoid conflict with a state whose leaders are experiencing
domestic political difficulties (Fordham, 2005). Despite the mixed arguments, this dis-
cussion clearly suggests that foreign policies do matter to the electorate and highlights
the importance of exploring how the electoral “butter-vs-guns” tradeoffs may vary with
respect to a country’s level of conflict involvement.5
According to the partisan explanation of economic policy, parties of the left favour
more state intervention, income redistribution and expansionary fiscal policies, com-
pared to parties of the right. The empirical evidence strongly supports partisan effects
on the size of the government, and moderately supports partisan effects in some specific
policy areas; such as, social and welfare spending (see Franzese, 2002). In many cases,
however, the evidence seems to suggest that partisan governments’ resource to these
policies depends heavily on their international and domestic politico-economic context.
Andrews (1994) finds that globalization reduces the ability of governments to influence
the domestic economy and leads to policy convergence, whereas Garrett (1995) and Po-
trafke (2009) show that globalization does not restrict, but rather encourages partisan
politics. Other studies relate the weakening of partisan influences over the past three
decades to an increased necessity of austerity (Kittel & Obinger, 2003), the process of
European integration (von Hagen, 2006; Efthyvoulou, 2011), or a general institutional
change that took place in the 1990s (Herwartz & Theilen, 2014).
While various categories of public spending have been widely explored by the par-
tisan cycle literature, very few studies attempt to explain how partisan politics affect
patterns of defence spending. This is partly because most studies of military spending
focus on the United States where the two-party/single-government context offers little
variation, and partly because the predictions regarding the direction of effects are not
clear-cut. On one hand, left-wing governments may use military spending as welfare
policy in disguise, but, on the other hand, they may reduce military spending because
of their dovish positions on international relations (Whitten & Williams, 2011). The
existing empirical evidence is also contradictory. Kollias & Paleologou (2003) find that
the Greek defence spending is higher during left administrations, Dalen & Swank (1996)
and Karago¨l & Turhan (2008) find the opposite effects for the Netherlands and Turkey,
respectively, whereas Potrafke (2011) and Kauder & Potrafke (2015) find no evidence of
partisan military cycles in OECD countries and Germany, respectively. Clearly, more
analysis and empirical work are needed in order to determine which argument is more
consistent with historical experience.
3 A Theoretical Model
Building upon the framework developed by Rogoff & Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and
Drazen & Eslava (2010), we now present a theoretical model that explains how politi-
cians use the butter-vs-guns tradeoff to increase their re-election chances and to promote
5Note that the argument that leaders sometimes go to war to divert attention from domestic prob-
lems is controversial and imbued with caveats and exceptions (for example, the country must experience
a recession). We therefore refrain from directly tackling this issue, which also falls outside the scope
of our contribution.
Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs Guns 7
their partisan objectives. The aim of the model is threefold: first, to understand why
citizens vote for politicians who engage in such tradeoff for opportunistic purposes, and
under which conditions this can be an equilibrium; second, to identify factors that shape
this electoral fiscal manipulation; and, third, to outline how electoral and partisan cy-
cles, two phenomena which are usually studied separately, can co-exist when we focus
on social and military spending.
3.1 Voters
We consider a simple two-period economy in which elections take place at the end of
period 1 and two candidates (parties) face each other: an incumbent I and a challenger
C.6 Voters derive utility from two different types of public goods: social expenditure
gt and military expenditure mt. In addition, they derive utility from the ideological
stance of the politician in office. Thus, the utility of voter i with ideology pii in period
t = 1, 2 can be written as:
V it = f(gt) +Wb(mt)−
(
pii − piQ
)2
, Q ∈ {I, C} (1)
where W takes the value 1 if the country is in conflict, and 0 otherwise, capturing
the fact that voters care about military expenditure only in the face of conflict,7 and(
pii − piQ
)
represents the distance between the ideology of the voter and the ideology of
the politician in power Q ∈ {I, C}. We assume that voters have preferences over the
two goods which are separable, and that the two functional forms satisfy f ′(gt) > 0,
f ′′(gt) < 0, b
′(mt) > 0, b
′′(mt) < 0.
At the beginning of period 1, the incumbent politician decides on the spending
allocation to the two goods. The election takes place at the end of period 1 and voters
decide whether to vote for the incumbent or the challenger. The present expected
discounted utility of individual i in period 1 is given by:
U i1 = V
i
1 (I) + βE1V
i
2 (Q)
where β is the discount factor and E1 is the expectation operator conditional on infor-
mation in period 1. A voter prefers the incumbent over the challenger if he expects to
receive more utility from the former in period 2.
We also assume that a military conflict, when occurs, lasts for both periods. We will
therefore examine how the politico-economic equilibria look like under two scenarios:
one in which the country is in peace and one in which the country is in conflict.8
6Although we consider a two period model, our results also hold under a more complex dynamic
model in which the weight the politician puts on voters changes every two periods.
7This allows us to simplify our analysis. It must be stressed, however, that the results are robust to
an alternative specification in which voters assign positive value to military spending in every period
and this value is relatively higher when the country is in conflict.
8In a more complete model in which we allow for uncertainty about the existence of a conflict after
the elections, our main results will not be altered. However additional elements, like the probability of
having a conflict, will re-define the parameter space under which the electoral cycle equilibrium holds.
While interesting, this dimension is beyond the scope of this paper.
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3.2 Politicians
The incumbent politician must decide at any point in time how to allocate resources to
the two goods, gt and mt.
9 Thus, the budget constraint of the government is given by:
st = gt +mt
All politicians are characterised by the following utility function:
V
P |Q
t = ωP
[
f(gt) +Wb(mt)−
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piQ
)2]
+ l(piP )h(mt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ideology
+
DPt

n(mt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
status
+X

− (piP − piQ)2 (2)
where the function V
P |Q
t indicates the current level of utility of a politician P when
politician Q is in office, ωP is the weight the politician puts on voters, N is the constant
population size, and DPt takes the value 1 if P is in office and 0 otherwise.
The first part of Eq. (2) captures how much the politician cares about voters.
The second part captures the utility derived from military expenditure conditional on
the politician’s ideological position piP , as we expect right-wing politicians to be more
concerned about defence and national security compared to their left-wing counterparts.
We assume that the function h(mt) satisfies h
′(mt) > 0 and h
′′(mt) < 0, and, without
loss of generalisation, that l′(piP ) > 0. The third part of Eq. (2) captures the returns to
political power, which consists of two elements: the value of “status” n(mt) associated
with investment in military spending (with n′(mt) > 0 and n
′′(mt) < 0) and a fixed
value X of being in office. Finally, the fourth part of Eq. (2) captures the disutility of
having a different ideology represented in office.
The weight ωP is known to the politician, but is only observed by voters after the
election. Thus, before the election, voters try to infer the value of ωP from the incum-
bent’s spending decisions in period 1. For simplicity and to avoid excessive notation,
we assume that there are two types of politicians with weights {ωH , ωL}. We denote
with Pr(ωP = ωH) = p the probability that the politician is a “good” politician (cares
a lot about voters) and with Pr(ωP = ωL) = 1− p the probability that the politician is
a “bad” politician (does not care much about voters). Also, we assume for simplicity
that ωH →∞ (the good politician only cares about voters and not himself), although
our results do not strictly depend on this assumption. We will solve the problem by
backward induction and focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.
3.3 Equilibrium
The post-election period In the post-election period, the incumbent politician
maximises his current level of utility. A good politician chooses the budget composition
that maximises the voters’ current utility, which depends on the military condition of
9Since the aim of the model is to show how political parties manipulate the budget composition to
get re-elected, we assume that the volume of public expenditure is fixed.
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the country. When the country is in peace, he allocates all the budget to social expen-
diture. When the country is in conflict, he chooses the level of social expenditure, g∗,
such that:
f ′(g∗)− b′ (s− g∗) = 0 (3)
Note that the concavity of both functions ensures that an optimal solution with 0 <
g∗ < s exists.10 Consequently, in period t = 2, a good politician plays the following
strategy:
g2(ωP = ωHupslopeI) =
{
s if W = 0
g∗ otherwise
}
(4)
A bad politician, instead, cares also about himself. He thus chooses the level of social
expenditure, g∗∗, such that:
ωL [f
′(g∗∗)−Wb′ (s− g∗∗)]− l(piI)h′ (s− g∗∗)− n′ (s− g∗∗) = 0
Note that b′(.), h′(.) and n′(.) are all positive and thus g∗∗ < g∗ < s.11 Also note that a
bad politician chooses a higher level of military expenditure because higher investment
in armed forces can improve his “status”, and, if right-wing, satisfy his hawkish foreign
policy preferences.12 Rearranging the previous equation we obtain:
ωLf
′(g∗∗) = ωLWb
′ (s− g∗∗) + l(piI)h′ (s− g∗∗) + n′ (s− g∗∗) (5)
The left-hand-side (LHS) of Eq. (5) is monotonically decreasing in g, while the right-
hand-side (RHS) is monotonically increasing in g. As long as ωL > 0, an interior
solution exists. Moreover, it follows from (5), that: (i) the level of social expenditure
g∗∗ is a positive function of the weight ωL and a negative function of the incumbent’s
ideology piI ; and, (ii) whenW = 1 (the country is in conflict), the bad politician chooses
a lower level of social expenditure, g∗∗∗, such that g∗∗∗ < g∗∗. Consequently, in period
2, a bad politician plays the following strategy:
g2(ωP = ωLupslopeI) =
{
g∗∗(piI) if W = 0
g∗∗∗(piI) otherwise
}
(6)
The above results can be summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. In the post-election period: (i) good politicians choose a higher level of
social expenditure than bad politicians; (ii) all politicians, regardless of ideology, choose
higher levels of military expenditure when the country is in conflict; (iii) politicians
favouring more hawkish foreign policies and less generous social assistance (right-wing
politicians) choose a higher level of military expenditure (lower level of social expendi-
ture), regardless of the military condition of the country.
10The solution is interior as long as f ′(0) > b′(s) and f ′(s) < b′(0).
11Assume that ωL is low enough such that: ωLf
′(s) < l(piI)h′(0) + n′(0). This ensures that the bad
politician does not want to allocate all sources to social expenditure.
12Assume that the larger the value of piI , the more to the right the politician is.
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The election period In the election period, good politicians always choose the
budget composition that is most preferred by voters and thus provide the maximum
possible level of social expenditure (as they do in the post-election period); that is,
g2(ωP = ωHupslopeI) = g1(ωP = ωHupslopeI). Bad politicians, on the other hand, follow the
good politicians’ strategy only when the benefits of doing this outweigh the costs. In
this subsection we will explore this issue, by making a distinction between a peaceful
economy and a country in conflict.
The peaceful economy In the election period, a bad incumbent politician chooses
the budget composition that corresponds to g1 = s only when:
U I(g1 = s/ωP = ωL) > U
I(g1 = g
∗∗(piI)/ωP = ωL)
It can be shown (see Appendix A.3.1 for details) that this condition is satisfied when:
∆H(g∗∗(piI)) + (n
(
s− g∗∗(piI)
)
≤ β∆ρ (s)

(∆H(g∗∗(piI ))−∆H(g∗∗(piC))) + p∆H(g∗∗(piC))︸ ︷︷ ︸
rents from policy choices
+ n
(
s− g∗∗(piI)
)
+X︸ ︷︷ ︸
rents from political power
+∆Π

 (7)
where ∆ρ (s) = ρ (s) − ρ(g∗∗(piI)) and ρ (.) is the politician’s expected probability of
re-election from choosing a certain budget composition. The LHS of Eq. (7) represents
the opportunity cost for the incumbent (with ideology piI) of choosing g1 = s instead of
g1 = g
∗∗(piI). It consists of two terms: the first term, ∆H(g∗∗(piI)), is the loss in utility
resulting from his policy choices, given by:
∆H(g∗∗(piI)) = ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piI))− f(s)
)
+ l
(
piI
)
h
(
s− g∗∗(piI)
)
(8)
whereas the second term, (n
(
s− g∗∗(piI)
)
, is the loss in “status” associated with lower
military spending. As shown in Eq. (8), ∆H(g∗∗(piI)) consists of two elements: (i) the
value of voters’ disutility from the implemented policy being far away for what they
prefer; and, (ii) the loss to the incumbent from implementing a policy that does not
reflect his ideological preferences (which increases when the politician is on the right of
the political spectrum).
The RHS of Eq. (7) represents the future expected benefits for the incumbent (with
ideology piI) from choosing g1 = s instead of g1 = g
∗∗(piI). This is captured by the
current value of the expected re-election rents multiplied by the expected increased
probability of re-election, ∆ρ (s), when he chooses g1 = s instead of g1 = g
∗∗(piI). More
precisely, the first term in brackets (on the RHS of Eq. (7)) is the gain to the incumbent
from implementing his preferred policies in the post-election period, the second term
represents the rents of holding office, and the third term, ∆Π, is the change in utility
reflecting the incumbent’s preferred ideology. Specifically, ∆Π is written as:
∆Π = ωL
[
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piC
)2
N
−
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piI
)2
N
]
+
(
piI − piC
)2
that is, the sum of: (i) the gain (loss) to the incumbent from the implemented ideological
policy being close (far) from that of voters; and, (ii) the incumbent’s own utility gain
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from having the implemented policy representing his ideological position rather than
that of his opponent.
The electoral trade-off between “butter” and “guns” is clearly reflected in Eq. (7).
If the incumbent politician provides butter to voters in the election period, he will
lose the rents associated with choosing a higher level of guns, but he will increase the
probability of being re-elected in the next period. This, in turn, will allow him to obtain
certain gains: one associated with holding office (entering both the opportunity cost
today and the future expected benefits) and one associated with partisanship (included
in the ∆H term).
To sum up, in the election period, a bad politician plays the following strategy:
g1(ωP = ωLupslopeI) =


s
if (7) holds
with strict inequality
s with probability
q ∈ [0, 1]
if (7) holds
0 otherwise


The economy in conflict When the economy is in conflict, the strategy for each
type of politician changes slightly, replacing g1 = s by g1 = g
∗ and g∗∗(piI) by g∗∗∗(piI).13
Since s > g∗ > g∗∗(piI) > g∗∗∗(piI), we cannot say with certainty whether the variation in
military expenditure between the election period and the post-election period depends
on the military condition of the country. Under restrictive assumptions, however, it can
be shown that the electoral reduction in military spending is indeed smaller when the
economy is in conflict than when the economy is in peace. The following proposition
focuses on this result.
Proposition 2. If the economy is in conflict and ωL → 0, then military expenditure is
subject to less electoral manipulation.
Proof. Notice that g∗∗∗(piI) is obtained from the following condition:
ωLf
′(g∗∗∗(piI)) = ωLb
′(s− g∗∗∗(piI)) + l(piI)h′(s− g∗∗∗(piI)) + n′(s− g∗∗∗(piI))
Also note that, as ωL → 0, g
∗∗∗(piI) = g∗∗(piI) = 0. Consequently, under a conflict
environment, the bad politician will choose g1 = g
∗ with probability q, while under a
peaceful environment, he will choose g1 = s with the same probability. Since s > g
∗
and in period 2 both g∗∗∗(piI) and g∗∗(piI) collapse to zero, the result follows.
3.4 Voting behaviour
The voter i votes for the incumbent if he expects to receive higher utility in t = 2 under
the incumbent than under the challenger; that is, when the following condition holds:
E [U(g2/I, g1)]−
(
pii − piI
)2
> E [U(g2/C)]−
(
pii − piC
)2
(9)
In period 1 the voter does not observe how much the incumbent or the challenger care
about him. To infer the challenger’s type, he can only use information about the (ex-
ante) distribution of ωP . On the other hand, to infer the incumbent’s type, he can also
13The expression for Eq. (7) also changes (see Appendix A.3.2 for details).
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use the information provided by the realised value g1. We assume that the voter uses
the Bayes’ rule to obtain Pr(ωP = ωH/g1). Note that Pr(g1 = g
∗∗(piI)/ωP = ωH) = 0,
and thus, Pr(g1 = s/ωP = ωH) = 1 (g1 = g
∗∗∗(piI) and g1 = g
∗, respectively, under
conflict).14 Applying the Bayes’ rule (see Appendix A.3.3 for details), we have that:15
Pr(ωP = ωH/g1 = s) =
p
p+ (1− p)q
(10)
Using previous information, Eq. (9) can be written as:
∆p(g1)
[
f(g˜2)− f(g2(pi
I)) +W
[
b (s− g˜2)− b
(
s− g2(pi
I)
)]]
>
(
pii − piI
)2
−
(
pii − piC
)2
(11)
where g˜2 ∈ {s, g
∗} and g2(pi
I) ∈ {g∗(piI), g∗∗(piI)} depending on whether the economy
is in conflict, and, ∆p(g1) = p(g1) − p reflects how voters change their beliefs about
the type of the incumbent when they observe g1. The LHS of Eq. (11) represents
the expected gain (loss) in utility from public good consumption if the incumbent is
re-elected, while the RHS represents the cost (benefits) in terms of ideology if the re-
election occurs. The RHS will be positive when the voter’s ideology is further away
from that of the incumbent than from that of the challenger.
Note that the sign of this inequality depends on the ideology of the voter and the
spending decisions of politicians. For simplicity, we assume that there exist three types
of voters based on ideological preferences: the incumbent’s core voters (pˆiI), the chal-
lenger’s core voters (pˆiC) and the swing voters (pˆiM), who are ideologically in the middle
of the two candidates. The first two types always vote for their preferred candidate,
regardless of his spending choices in period 1. The swing voters, on the other hand, vote
on the basis of the policy actions taken by the incumbent in period 1 (pˆiM = pˆi
I+pˆiC
2
).
Consequently, the behaviour of voters can be summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (Voting strategies). In an election period, the optimal voting strategy
of an individual i with ideology j = {I,M,C} is given by: (i) if pii = pˆiI , then he votes
for the incumbent with probability 1; (ii) if pii = pˆiC, then he votes for the challenger
with probability 1; (iii) if pii = pˆiM , then he votes the incumbent with probability r(g1),
where:
r(g1) =


1 if p(g1) > p
r ∈ [0, 1] if p(g1) > p
0 otherwise


Consider for simplicity that the proportion of voters with an ideology j is given by
φj. Let us assume that
{
φI , φC
}
are less than half, otherwise electoral cycles cannot
emerge (politicians’ choices have no effect on voting behaviour). Let us also assume
that the winner is chosen by simple majority rule. If p(g1) < p, the challenger obtains a
proportion φC+φM of the votes, and since φI < 1/2 and abstention is not allowed,16 the
challenger wins the elections. If p(g1) > p, the incumbent obtains a proportion φ
I +φM
of the votes, and since φC < 1/2, the incumbent will get re-elected. Finally, in case
14Note that a good politician will never choose g1 = g
∗∗(piI) (g1 = g
∗∗∗(piI) under conflict).
15When the economy is in conflict, we have that: Pr(ωP = ωH/g1 = g
∗) = pp+(1−p)q .
16The results hold when there is abstention, but this is equally distributed across ideologies.
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p(g1) = p, the incumbent will obtain φ
I + rφM and get re-elected if φI + rφM > 1/2.
To sum up, the incumbent will remain in office when p(g1) > p, provided that, in case
of equality, there is a sufficiently large number of swing voters (r > 1/2−φ
I
φM
). This has
an important implication: a bad politician who decides to stick to his most preferred
spending choices will never win the elections.
3.5 Politico-economic equilibria
We can now characterise the possible politico-economic equilibria and study the prop-
erties of these equilibria. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a vector of strategies and
a set of beliefs for politicians and voters such that: (i) the incumbent’s strategy is opti-
mal given his beliefs and the strategy of voters; (ii) voters’ behaviour is optimal given
their own beliefs and the strategy of politicians; and (iii) politicians’ and voters’ beliefs
are consistent with the implied outcomes. In this section, we will focus on a peaceful
economy. Similar equilibria, however, can be obtained when the economy is in conflict
(see Appendix A.3.4 for details).
We can make a distinction between three cases depending on whether condition (7)
holds. Note that, for all three cases, ∆ρ (s) = 1, as this constitutes an equilibrium set
of beliefs for politicians.
Case 1: If condition (7) holds with strict inequality, the incumbent will choose
to play g1 = s with probability 1, and the swing voters will set p(g1 = s) = p and
zero otherwise. Hence, the swing voters will vote for the incumbent with probability
r > 1/2−φ
I
φM
17 and the incumbent will get re-elected with probability 1 provided that he
plays g1 = s.
18 In this case we have a pooling equilibrium since both good and bad
politicians are playing the same set of strategies.
Case 2: If condition (7) holds with strict equality, the incumbent will choose to
play g1 = s with probability q, and the swing voters will set p1(g1 = s) > p and zero
otherwise. The incumbent will thus get re-elected with probability 1 provided that he
plays g1 = s.
19 In this case we have a mixed equilibrium.
Case 3: If condition (7) does not hold (LHS of (7)>RHS of (7)), the incumbent will
choose to play g∗∗(piI), and the swing voters will set p(g1 = s) = 1 and zero otherwise.
Hence, the swing voters will vote for the challenger with probability 1, resulting in the
incumbent losing the elections. In this case we have a separating equilibrium since good
and bad politicians are playing different strategies in the election period.
3.6 Theoretical predictions
The discussion in the previous section generates the first prediction of our model:
Prediction 1: A tradeoff between “butter” and “guns” can serve as a political-electoral
tool. During election periods, politicians shift the composition of public spending
towards social expenditure and away from military expenditure to improve their re-
election prospects.
17If r < 1/2−φ
I
φM
, then the incumbent anticipates that he will not get re-elected and chooses to deviate.
18Note that ∆ρ (s) = 1 is consistent with the equilibrium since ρ(s) = 1 and ρ(g∗∗1 (pi
I)) = 0.
19If q = 1, then p(g1 = s) = p and the incumbent will get re-elected provided that r >
1/2−φI
φM
(which is the pure strategy equilibrium defined above).
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Proposition 4. The incumbent politician’s ideological positions influence his spend-
ing choices. When the incumbent favours austere welfare policies and hawkish foreign
policies, the average level of military expenditure (social expenditure) is larger (smaller).
Proof. In the election period the incumbent chooses either g1 = s (g1 = g
∗ when the
country is in conflict) with probability q or his most preferred level. In the post-
election period, he always chooses his most preferred level. Consequently, the average
level of military (social) expenditure is larger under an incumbent who favours increased
allocations to “guns” (“butter”).
This proposition summarises the second prediction of our model:
Prediction 2: Social expenditure are higher during left administrations, whereas mil-
itary expenditure are higher during right administrations.
Proposition 5. When the economy is in conflict the average level of military expendi-
ture is larger.
Proof. When the economy is in conflict, the incumbent’s choice in the election period
is g1 = g
∗ with probability q, regardless of his ideology or type. When the economy is
in peace, his choice in the election period is g1 = s with the same probability. Since
s > g∗ and the post-election level of military expenditure is always larger under a
conflict environment (see Proposition 1(ii)), the result follows.
Proposition 5, together with Proposition 2, lead to the third prediction of our model:
Prediction 3: When the country is in conflict: (i) the average level of military ex-
penditure is larger; (ii) military spending (and thus the budget composition) is subject
to less electoral manipulation. The latter does not prevent the occurrence of partisan
cycles: under a conflict environment, politicians of both ideologies engage in smaller
electoral defence cutbacks.
We now proceed to test these three predictions. In the next sections, we first describe
the key features of the data on social and military expenditure and then specify the
empirical model for carrying out the tests.
4 Data on Social and Military Expenditure
We consider yearly data on social and military expenditure, as a share of GDP, for 22
OECD countries (see Table A.1). Data on social expenditure are obtained from the
OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) for the period 1981-2009. SOCX includes
social spending flows controlled by the general government that can be attributed to
an individual beneficiary; hence excludes pure public goods like national defence. The
database groups social expenditure into nine policy areas depending on their social pur-
pose,20 with old age, health and family expenditure being the largest spending items.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 illustrates that, on average, public social spending-to-GDP ratios
increased most significantly in the early 1980s, early 1990s and, again at the beginning
of this millennium. In between these decennial turning points spending-to-GDP ratios
20These areas are: old-age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labour market
policies, unemployment, housing, and other social policy areas.
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changed little; during the 1980s the average public social spending-to-GDP ratio oscil-
lated around 19%, while after the economic downturn in the early 1990s it oscillated
around 22% (see also Adema et al., 2012).
Data on military expenditure are taken from the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), which is considered to be the most reliable data source
on aggregated military expenditure from 1988 onwards. We do not explore military
spending prior to 1988 since the alternative source which covers this period - the Cor-
relates of War (COW) Database - is notoriously less accurate (Bove & Brauner, 2015).
Moreover, combining the two sources is problematic in terms of comparability because
the exact definition of what comprises military spending varies over time and across
countries, and these variations are not captured in the same way by the two sources.21
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows that, since the end of the Cold War, the average military
spending-to-GDP ratio has been steadily declining: from 2.4% in 1988 to 1.7% in 2009.
This is primarily a consequence of the demise of the Soviet threat. In addition, during
the last decade, most European countries have been imposing austerity measures to re-
duce their budget deficits, with heavy cuts in military expenditure. It must be stressed
that 14 out of the 22 sampled OECD countries are members of the NATO military al-
liance, and thus, contribute to NATO’s commonly funded budgets.22 In addition, they
support NATO by maintaining forces and assets that they pledge to NATO through a
defence planning process (Johnson & Thomas, 1999). As shown in panel (c) of Figure 1,
the average military spending-to-GDP ratio in NATO countries is between 0.7 and 1.2
percentage points higher than in non-NATO countries.
< Insert Figure 1 here >
5 Empirical Model Specification
To test the predictions of Section 3.6, we employ an empirical specification that builds on
the work of Potrafke (2009) and Efthyvoulou (2012) in the selection and transformation
of variables, and takes the following form:
∆ lnYit =α∆ lnYit−1 + βXit + γZit + δ‘Election’it + ϑ‘Ideology’it + µi + λt + εit
(M.1)
where ∆ lnYit is the growth rate of Yit in country i and year t, Yit ∈ {‘TSE’, ‘TME’}
is the share of social or military expenditure to GDP, Xit is a vector of expenditure-
specific control variables, Zit is a vector of variables capturing economic and politico-
institutional constraints; ‘Election’it and ‘Ideology’it are indicators coding the timing
of elections and the government’s political orientation (with higher values indicating
more left-wing governments), respectively; µi and λt represent country-specific effects
and year-specific effects, respectively; εit is an i.i.d. error term.
The existence of a butter-vs-guns tradeoff at election timing (Prediction 1) is con-
firmed when the coefficient on ‘Election’it is positive in the social expenditure equation
21Bove & Brauner (2015) find major inconsistencies between SIPRI and COW and emphasise the
difficulties in extending the SIPRI data backwards in time.
22NATO alliance members are asked to spend on their militaries a minimum of 2% of GDP; yet,
very often members do not meet this target.
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and negative in the military expenditure equation. Since this tradeoff is more appeal-
ing to voters (and thus military spending is subject to more electoral manipulation)
when a country is in peace (Prediction 3), we expect the coefficient on ‘Election’it in
the military expenditure equation to be larger in absolute value when we exclude the
countries involved in conflicts. Finally, to verify the existence of partisan effects in the
two types of expenditure of the opposite direction (Prediction 2), the coefficient on
‘Ideology’it must have a positive sign in the social expenditure equation and negative
in the military expenditure equation.
Vector Xit in the social expenditure equation contains the following commonly used
control variables: the growth rate of real GDP per capita (∆ ln ‘GDP per capita’) to
capture changes in economic development; the growth rate of the unemployment rate
(∆ ln ‘Unemployment’) to capture the influence of the domestic business cycle; and,
the growth rate of the dependency ratio (∆ ln ‘Dependency Ratio’) - measured by the
ratio of people younger than 15 or older than 64 to the working age population - to
capture social support requirements resulting from changes in population age struc-
tures. On the other hand, vector Xit in the military expenditure equation contains
the following measures of conflict involvement and security threats: the growth rate of
the size of armed forces as a percentage of the labour force (∆ ln ‘Armed Forces’); the
growth rate of potential and actual enemies’ military expenditure (∆ ln ‘Rivals’); a 0-1
dummy variable capturing the abolition of the draft and the shift to an all-volunteer
force (‘Volunteers’); a 0-1 dummy variable capturing external military operations and
wars23 (‘Wars’); and, a 0-1 dummy variable coding NATO membership and allowing
for the effects of alliance spill-ins (‘NATO’). Finally, vector Xit in the military to social
expenditure equation includes all the aforementioned control variables.
As pointed out in Section 2, globalization may cause a convergence around market-
friendly policies. In addition, separation of powers can work as a commitment device
and moderate politically-driven fiscal policy manipulations (Saporiti & Streb, 2008). To
control for such constraints, we include in vector Zit two variables: the growth rate of the
KOF index of economic globalization (∆ ln ‘Globalization’) and the POLCON index of
political constraints (‘Political Constraints’). The KOF index of economic globalization
embraces the economic dimension of globalization and is constructed using data on
actual flows and restrictions. On the other hand, the POLCON index of political
constraints includes information on veto players, and thus, measures the degree of
institutional constraints on the executive branch of the government.
The electoral variable ‘Election’it codes the year the executive is elected. In other
words, it equals 1 in the years of legislative elections in parliamentary countries and in
the years of presidential elections in presidential countries, and 0 in all other years. The
partisan variable ‘Ideology’it is the Potrafke (2009)’s government ideology index, which
places the cabinet on a left-right scale with values between 1 and 5. Specifically, it
takes the following values: 1 if the share of governing right-wing parties in terms of the
seats in the cabinet and in parliament is larger than 2/3; 2 if it is between 1/3 and 2/3;
and, 3 if the share of centrist parties is 50% or if the left-wing and right-wing parties
23This variable takes value 1 during year t and year t+1 of external military operations (for example,
ISAF in Afghanistan, UN missions) and/or intra-state and inter-state wars. The Correlates of War
data set defines war as sustained combat, involving organised armed forces, resulting in a minimum of
1,000 battle-related deaths. Intra-state (civil) wars refer to those that predominantly take place within
the recognised territory of a state, whereas inter-state wars to those that take place between states.
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form a coalition government that is not dominated by one side or the other. The index
is symmetric and takes the values 4 and 5 if left-wing parties dominate. Following
Potrafke (2009, 2012), we normalise this variable (mean zero, variance one) so that
we can directly interpret the coefficients and marginal effects across the specifications.
Table A.1 reports the number of elections in the sample, whereas Table A.2 reports
descriptive statistics and data sources for all the aforementioned variables.
Equation (M.1) is a standard panel data specification, in which all continuous vari-
ables are in growth rates. Taking growth rates offers two advantages: first, it avoids
problems of spurious inference when the time-series are non-stationary in levels;24 sec-
ond, it eliminates time-invariant, country-specific effects in levels. On the other hand,
using growth rates does not control for potential country-specific time trends in lev-
els, and thus, it is sensible to estimate equation (M.1) using either the fixed-effects or
the random-effects estimator. A Hausman test indicates that the model with random
effects is preferable to fixed effects for all equations, which is consistent with the fact
that our sampled countries are drawn from a larger population of OECD countries.
Hence, we adopt the random-effects (RE) estimator25 and use heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors to calculate the corresponding test statis-
tics. In addition, in order to account for the possibility of contemporaneous correlation
across countries, we present the results of regressions with panel-corrected standard
errors (PCSE) according to Beck & Katz (1996), assuming a panel-specific first-order
autocorrelation structure. An econometric problem that arises here is that the growth
rates of public expenditure may exhibit persistence over time, and thus static model
estimates will suffer from omitted variable bias. Tests of statistical significance reveal
that, while the estimate of parameter α fails to reach statistical significance in the
equations of military expenditure and military-to-social expenditure, it is highly sig-
nificant in the equation of social expenditure. This suggests that social expenditure
should preferably be modelled with a dynamic structure. In accordance with the large
sample properties of the GMM methods, the well-known first-differencing and system-
GMM estimators are biased in our case and small-sample bias-corrected estimators are
more appropriate. Consequently, for the social expenditure equation, we also consider
the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator developed by Bruno
(2005) and designed for dynamic panel data models with small N .26
24Indeed, panel unit root tests indicate that some of our variables are non-stationary in levels, but
become stationary when transformed into first difference form.
25Note that, in presence of slowly changing variables, fixed effects soak up most of their explanatory
power, and they “make it hard for such variables to appear either substantively or statistically signifi-
cant” (Beck, 2001, p. 285). For a number of countries, the ideology variable changes only once during
the sampled period, and, more generally, some countries can be characterised as ‘more left-wing’ (or
‘more right-wing’), on average, compared to others. Thus, by using fixed country effects, we fail to
capture this variation across countries and lose important information.
26We choose the Blundell & Bond (1998) estimator as the initial estimator in which the growth rates
of GDP per capita and unemployment rates are treated as endogenous variables and the instruments
are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2006). Since the analytical variance estimator performs poorly
for large coefficients of the lagged dependent variable (Bruno, 2005), we undertake 200 replications of
the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. The results remain qualitatively the same
when the Arellano & Bond (1991) and the Anderson & Hsiao (1982) are chosen as initial estimators or
when we undertake different number of bootstrap replications, such as 50, 100 or 500. The preference
of the RE estimator, the PCSE estimator and the bias-corrected LSDV in this context is also discussed
in Potrafke (2009).
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6 Empirical Findings
6.1 Basic Results
We start by estimating the total social expenditure (‘TSE’) equation for the period
1981-2009 using a dynamic framework (see column (1) of Table 1). As a first point, we
can notice that our proxies for economic development and business cycle fluctuations
(namely, growth rates of per capita GDP and unemployment) display the expected sign
and are highly statistically significant. Furthermore, our results indicate that a higher
degree of economic globalization is associated with a retrenchment in social spending.27
Turning now to our variables of interest, we find evidence confirming the predictions of
our model: the coefficients on ‘Election’ and ‘Ideology’ have the expected positive sign
and are statistically significant at conventional levels of significance. Qualitatively, the
findings imply that the growth rate of social expenditure (as a share of GDP) increases
by about 0.7 percentage points in election years,28 and by about 0.3 percentage points
when the ideology variable increases by one standard deviation.
Do left-wing governments generate higher welfare effort by targeting certain, more
vulnerable social groups? To answer this question, we implement the same analysis for
all possible combinations of the nine social policy areas, and we find that the impact
of partisanship becomes stronger and statistically more robust when we focus on three
categories of social expenditure, namely old age, family and incapacity-related benefits
(‘SSE’). As shown in column (2) of Table 1, once we allow the dependent variable to
include only these programs, the coefficient on ‘Ideology’ becomes larger in absolute
value and is now statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. On the other hand,
the results on the electoral variable remain essentially the same as those obtained for
the aggregated measure.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 report the results when we estimate the same re-
gression package for the shorter time period 1988-2009. This allows us to compare
the findings on social expenditure with those on military expenditure - which are only
available for the post-1987 period - and to investigate the persistence of the reported
effects in a period characterised by deepened globalization. Overall, the results confirm
the existence of a large election-year increase in the growth of both aggregated and
disaggregated measures of social expenditure (‘TSE’ and ‘SSE’, respectively), but at
the same time, indicate strong partisan shifts only in the latter. This, in turn, sug-
gests that the discipline and compensation effects of globalization do not contradict
each other and can actually co-exist. Welfare-enhancing preferences create incentives
for leftist governments to increase social expenditure and compensate citizens for the
risks of globalization. However, the discipline effect of globalization may restrict their
capacity to produce partisan cycles in all social welfare programs and direct their ef-
fort towards certain categories. The reported effects largely persist when we consider a
static framework (see columns (5) to (8)).
27Using the overall KOF index (instead of its economic subindex) results in a statistically insignificant
coefficient, as in Potrafke (2009). This suggests that the social and political dimensions of globalization
do not play an important role in explaining the dynamics of social spending in our sampled countries.
28We have also controlled for governments’ behaviour in the year prior to elections. The pre-election
variable appears to be statistically insignificant when added to the model, implying that politicians
engage in social spending increases only in election years.
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< Insert Table 1 here >
We continue by estimating the total29 military expenditure (‘TME’) equation for
the period 1988-2009 using RE. Looking at column (1) in Table 2, we can notice that
economic development plays an important role in explaining the dynamics of military
spending. Furthermore, we find positive and significant growth effects arising from the
proportion of the labour force in armed forces and the level of rivals’ military spending,
consistent with the traditional external action-reaction explanation of military expen-
diture. The variable ‘Wars’ also exerts a positive influence on the dependent variable.
Concerning our variables of interest, we can see that the coefficient on ‘Ideology’ is neg-
ative and statistically significant, indicating that the more to the left a government is,
the less will spend on the military (consistent with our theoretical predictions). Specif-
ically, the estimate suggests that the growth rate of military expenditure (as a share
of GDP) decreases by about 0.4 percentage points when the ideology variable increases
by one standard deviation. Finally, the results in column (1) provide no evidence of
electoral impacts in military spending.
As noted in Section 4, nearly two-third of our sampled countries are members of
NATO, and as such, they need to provide sufficient funds for modernising and restruc-
turing their defence forces to meet NATO’s requirements. This may suggest that politi-
cians’ abilities to manipulate military spending for electoral gains are, to some extent,
conditioned by NATO membership. To test this hypothesis, we replace the electoral
variable by the interaction terms ‘Election ∗ NATO1’ and ‘Election ∗ NATO0’ (coding
elections in NATO and non-NATO members, respectively) and run the same regression
as before. As shown in column (2) of Table 2, the coefficient on ‘Election ∗ NATO0’
is negative and highly statistically significant. A possible explanation for the failure to
find electoral shifts in NATO countries is that the necessary defence cutbacks in NATO
members are actually made in the year preceding the election. NATO members are less
reliant on soldiers and more on capital (Bove & Cavatorta, 2012), and spending on phys-
ical inputs is more rigid and takes longer to adjust for electoral purposes compared to
spending on military personnel, whose timing is easier to fine tune. We thus experiment
with both pre-election and on-election year cycles and find evidence in line with the
above explanation: defence spending grows in smaller than normal proportions during
the election year or the year prior to an election depending on whether the country is
a member of the NATO alliance30 (see column (3)). Qualitatively, the findings suggest
that the election-induced decrease in the growth rate of military spending (as a share
of GDP) is 1.1 percentage points in NATO countries (in the pre-electoral year) and 1.4
percentage points in non-NATO countries (in the electoral year). The reported results
are invariant to tests of robustness, such as, including among the explanatory variables
the growth rates of the unemployment rate and the dependency ratio (see column (4)),
and excluding from the model the variables ∆ ln ‘Armed Forces’ and ∆ ln ‘Rivals’ which
may be endogenous relative to the dependent variable (see column (5)).
The findings of the previous five paragraphs provide robust evidence that supports
the predictions of our theoretical model (Section 3.6). Specifically, the opposite sign
29Data on components of military expenditure are not currently available for all sampled coun-
tries/years to undertake a similar econometric analysis at the disaggregated level.
30We have also augmented the regression model with dummy variables coding both electoral and pre-
electoral years for the two country groups, and performed equality tests on the estimated parameters.
The results of these tests confirm the reported findings.
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of the electoral variable in the equations of social and military spending indicate the
existence of a butter-vs-guns tradeoff at election timing: increased allocations to “but-
ter” during elections come partly at the expense of “guns” (Prediction 1). Similarly,
the opposite sign of the ideology variable in the two equations implies that partisanship
plays a different role for the two types of expenditure: left-wing governments favour
increased allocations to “butter”, while right-wing governments favour increased alloca-
tions to “guns” (Prediction 2). At the same time, our results point to the complexity of
electoral and partisan effects, as outlined by the literature on context-conditional polit-
ical cycles (Franzese, 2002). More precisely, the timing of electoral defence reductions
is different across different country groups (NATO vs non-NATO members), while the
size and significance of partisan shifts in welfare spending become stronger when we
focus on certain social policy areas.
According to the last prediction of our theoretical model (Prediction 3), the timing
of elections has a weaker influence on military spending when a country is involved in
conflicts. This happens because, in such economies, voters assign a relatively higher
value to military spending due to security considerations, and hence, policymakers do
not have the same capacity to gain votes by engaging in pre-electoral tradeoffs between
“butter” and “guns”. We thus continue our analysis by excluding the 6 countries
with the highest frequency of external military operations and conflicts (as indicated
by the variable ‘Wars’), namely Canada, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom
and the United States. The results presented in column (6) of Table 2 support the
aforementioned prediction. Specifically, when we focus on the remaining 16 countries,
the coefficient on ‘Pre-Election ∗ NATO1’ becomes larger in absolute value and retains
its statistical significance, suggesting that the electoral-induced military cutbacks in
the 6 excluded NATO countries are, on average, smaller. Our results persist when we
estimate the same regression package using PCSE (see lower part of Table 2).
Finally, we run the regressions of Table 2 using the growth rate of military-to-social
expenditure (‘TME’/‘TSE’) as dependent variable, taking the timing of effects into ac-
count. As shown in Table 3a, the estimates on the political variables support, once
again, the propositions put forward in Section 3: governments sacrifice military spend-
ing around elections to enable vote-seeking increases in social spending, especially in
countries with no conflicts, and decide how to allocate national resources to the two
goods based on their ideological preferences. As expected, the results on the ratio of
military-to-social expenditure (which can more adequately capture the tradeoffs be-
tween “butter” and “guns”) are economically and statistically more significant than
those reported in the previous tables. Similar results are obtained when we re-define
the dependent variable as the growth rate of military spending to the disaggregated
measure of social spending (‘TME’/‘SSE’) - see lower part of Table 3a. The partisan
effects on the latter variable are much more pronounced, since the three social programs
included in ‘SSE’ are more influenced by government ideology. Finally, estimating the
same regression set-up using fixed (country) effects and adding the lagged dependent
variable does not change the inferences on the electoral and partisan variables (see
Table 3b).
< Insert Table 2, Table 3a Table 3b here >
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6.2 Robustness Checks
We test the robustness of our findings in several ways. First, we check whether the re-
ported effects depend on country-level idiosyncratic characteristics. Persson & Tabellini
(2002, 2003) and Albalate et al. (2012) argue that the nature of political system may
affect fiscal policy maneuverability around elections. More precisely, they suggest that
fewer vetoes and more stable conditions in parliamentary regimes (compared to pres-
idential regimes) and greater demand/preference for broad-based fiscal instruments in
proportional systems (compared to majoritarian systems) can induce more waste, rent
opportunities and re-distribution in favour of the majority and lead to higher elec-
toral cycles in broad-based programs. Similarly, one can argue that the design of fiscal
relation across the levels of government can play an important role: high degree of fis-
cal decentralization may induce opportunistic politicians to focus more on local public
goods and generate electoral cycles in geographically targeted programs during local
(rather than central) government elections. Following this discussion, we re-estimate
the regression specification of column (4) in Table 3a after excluding the countries with
presidential regimes, those with majoritarian elections, and those with the highest level
of fiscal decentralization (as reported in the 2009 OECD National Accounts Statistics).
Estimates based on the restricted sub-samples of countries are similar to the baseline
estimates and the key findings presented in the previous section do not change (see
columns (1) to (3) of Table 4). Notice that the relatively larger electoral effects in
columns (2) and (3) are mostly driven by the fact that some of the excluded countries
have high frequency of conflicts and thus less pronounced electoral military cycles. In-
deed, when we carry out the same robustness tests for the social expenditure equation,
the electoral effects are remarkably consistent with those in Table 1 (see Table A.3), sug-
gesting that the nature of political system and fiscal decentralization have no significant
impact on our findings.
We also experiment with an alternative election indicator that allows the electoral
effects to differ depending on whether the election takes place very early in the year.31
More precisely, we re-define the electoral variable to take value 1 in year t if an election
takes place during the last 10 months of year t and the first 2 months of year t + 1,
and 0 otherwise. As shown in column (4) of Table 4, the findings discussed in Section
6.1 are not much influenced by this exercise. Another concern with our results is that
treating all elections as predetermined may bias our estimates of electoral cycles. As
suggested by Rogoff (1990), incumbent governments may strategically choose the timing
of elections depending on economic outcomes and call early elections when the economy
is doing well. On the other hand, when the election is known well in advance, incumbent
politicians have more time and greater opportunity to manipulate fiscal policy (Brender
& Drazen, 2005). To address these issues, we consider a weighted electoral variable
that takes the value 0.5 in the years of non-predetermined elections, as in Efthyvoulou
(2012).32 This does not change our baseline estimates either, suggesting that assigning
31According to our theoretical framework, when a large fraction of voters is undecided, high levels
of social spending are recognised as being politically motivated, which creates a natural limit to gov-
ernments’ opportunistic behaviour (see also Drazen & Eslava, 2010). Thus, the shift towards social
expenditure is expected to occur only in the immediate period before elections.
32We classify an election as predetermined if it is held either at the constitutionally determined
election interval or within the expected year of the constitutionally fixed term. Among the 180 elections
in our full sample (1981-2009), 151 are classified as predetermined.
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the same weight to all elections does not lead to misleading inferences (see column (5) of
Table 4). The results for the political variables remain also qualitatively the same when
we leave the statistically insignificant control variables out of the model specification
(see column (6)).
Finally, we conduct further tests of robustness, such as using the CHECKS index of
the World Bank’s DPI as an indicator of political constraints (instead of the POLCON
index) and implementing the tests described in this section using fixed effects and adding
the lagged dependent variable in the static specifications. Once again, the inferences
on the political variables, as discussed in Section 6.1, do not change (results available
upon request).
< Insert Table 4 here >
7 Conclusions
The existing literature on political compositional budget cycles has focused on the inter-
active relationship between current and capital expenditure, while the existing literature
on the butter-vs-guns dilemma has mainly considered the economic implications of mili-
tary spending. No prior studies, however, have attempted to explain the butter-vs-guns
tradeoff within a political cycle setting: that is, how politicians use this tradeoff to gain
votes or to curry partisan favour. The current paper presents a theoretical model and
empirical evidence aiming at filling this gap. Our analysis produces three key results.
First, incumbent politicians sacrifice military spending at elections times as a way to
enable increases in social spending. Second, the degree to which governments engage in
such tradeoffs is smaller for countries involved in conflicts, where national security plays
an important role on voter choice. Finally, the spending allocation to the two public
goods depends on the government’s political orientation: parties of the left favour in-
creased allocations to “butter”, such as old age, family and incapacity-related benefits,
whereas parties of the right favour increased allocations to “guns”.
Our findings offer further insights on how incumbents manipulate public expendi-
ture for political purposes and point to three aspects of contextual variation in the
emerging cycles. First, patterns of electioneering are not symmetric across different
types of expenditure: politicians respond to voters’ spending priorities and change the
budget composition in a way that can purchase votes more effectively. Second, both
dimensions of political ideology (determined by welfare policy preferences and foreign
policy preferences) are influential in shaping the composition of public spending. Third,
politicians’ incentives and capacity to enact electoral and partisan policies are affected
by external economic constraints, the conflict environment and strategic opportunities.
These observations can explain why studies that focus on aggregate measures of public
expenditure, employ the same empirical specification across different expenditure cate-
gories, and ignore the context conditionality of political cycles, may find weak empirical
support for such cycles. As Franzese (2002, 2003) points out, reports of the empirical
demise of political cycle theories may have been greatly exaggerated and researchers
should rekindle their attention to this field - especially in the direction of addressing
theoretical and empirical inadequacies of prior models.
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Table 1: Political cycles in social expenditure
Dependent variable: ∆ ln Total Social Expenditure (∆ lnTSE), ∆ ln Subcomponents of Social Expenditure (∆ lnSSE).
1981-2009 1988-2009
Bias-corrected LSDV Bias-corrected LSDV Random effects Panel-corrected SE
∆ lnTSE ∆ lnSSE ∆ lnTSE ∆ lnSSE ∆ lnTSE ∆ lnSSE ∆ lnTSE ∆ lnSSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged Dependent 0.203*** 0.146*** 0.228*** 0.233***
(5.56) (3.91) (5.30) (5.14)
∆ ln GDP per capita -0.696*** -0.792*** -0.800*** -0.884*** -0.812*** -0.903*** -0.767*** -0.758***
(6.95) (7.76) (7.93) (7.44) (6.34) (4.79) (7.47) (6.94)
∆ ln Unemployment 0.038*** 0.005 0.030*** 0.006 0.048*** 0.020 0.047*** 0.025**
(3.06) (0.40) (2.59) (0.46) (3.83) (1.30) (4.11) (2.05)
∆ ln Globalization -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003**
(2.68) (2.87) (2.48) (2.75) (1.22) (1.34) (1.41) (2.03)
∆ ln Dependency Ratio 0.211 0.281 0.064 0.311 -0.006 0.220 -0.122 0.351
(1.10) (1.44) (0.26) (1.04) (0.02) (0.54) (0.48) (1.13)
Political Constraints -0.013 0.009 -0.013 0.004 -0.032 -0.026 -0.043*** -0.050***
(0.45) (0.30) (0.41) (0.12) (1.27) (1.02) (4.39) (4.34)
Election 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.005**
(2.84) (2.74) (2.92) (2.01) (5.13) (2.38) (3.48) (2.19)
Ideology (Left-Wing) 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.004**
(2.30) (3.51) (1.43) (2.90) (0.73) (2.26) (0.63) (2.35)
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 598 598 460 460 460 460 460 460
Number of N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
R2-Overall 0.56 0.40 0.54 0.41
Columns report estimated coefficients (z-statistics). ‘SSE’ includes three categories of social expenditure: old age, family and incapacity-related benefits.
***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 2: Political cycles in military expenditure
Dependent variable: ∆ ln Total Military Expenditure (∆ lnTME); Method: random-effects;
Sample period: 1988-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln GDP per capita -0.573*** -0.561*** -0.564*** -0.497*** -0.585*** -0.666***
(3.53) (3.48) (3.43) (2.89) (3.48) (3.77)
∆ ln Globalization 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.01) (0.29) (0.24) (0.32) (0.46) (0.22)
∆ ln Armed Forces 0.022*** 0.021** 0.022** 0.022** 0.019**
(2.62) (2.51) (2.46) (2.47) (2.47)
∆ ln Rivals 0.126*** 0.121*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.115**
(3.03) (3.00) (2.96) (3.14) (2.47)
Volunteers 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.017**
(0.23) (0.28) (0.23) (0.17) (0.07) (2.24)
Wars 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.009
(3.01) (3.18) (2.92) (3.01) (2.50) (0.93)
Political Constraints -0.023 -0.022 -0.024 -0.020 -0.021 -0.074
(0.82) (0.80) (0.84) (0.74) (0.70) (1.68)
NATO -0.003 -0.010 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005
(0.58) (1.39) (0.65) (0.49) (0.82) (0.65)
Election 0.001
(0.14)
Election ∗ NATO1 0.010
(1.23)
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.011** -0.012** -0.010** -0.016**
(2.42) (2.48) (2.12) (2.20)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014** -0.014*** -0.014**
(2.62) (2.59) (2.51) (2.71) (2.34)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004
(1.69) (1.74) (1.68) (1.71) (1.82) (1.49)
∆ ln Unemployment 0.021
(1.36)
∆ ln Dependency Ratio -0.134
(0.60)
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 462 462 462 462 462 336
Number of N 22 22 22 22 22 16
R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23
Dependent variable: ∆ ln Total Military Expenditure (∆ lnTME); Method: panel-corrected SE;
Sample period: 1988-2009
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.012** -0.012** -0.010** -0.019**
(2.01) (2.08) (1.79) (2.01)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014*
(2.06) (2.03) (2.10) (2.07) (1.88)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.006*
(1.80) (1.78) (1.73) (1.70) (1.69) (1.67)
Columns report estimated coefficients (z-statistics). Column (6) excludes the following countries: Canada, France,
Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
confidence level, respectively. For brevity and comparability, the table displays the results of regressions with PCSE
only for the variables of interest.
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Table 3a: Political cycles in military-to-social expenditure ratio
Dependent variable: ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: random-effects; Sample period: 1988-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln GDP per capita 0.232 0.244 0.237 0.010 0.210 0.168
(1.08) (1.16) (1.11) (0.04) (0.93) (0.67)
∆ ln Globalization 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.38) (0.59) (0.59) (0.45) (0.66) (0.15)
∆ ln Armed Forces 0.020** 0.019** 0.020** 0.022** 0.018**
(2.09) (2.02) (2.01) (2.09) (2.22)
∆ ln Rivals 0.164* 0.158* 0.175* 0.175* 0.182
(1.72) (1.67) (1.71) (1.97) (1.36)
Volunteers 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.028***
(0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) (0.32) (2.98)
Wars 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.018** 0.011
(3.66) (3.82) (3.61) (2.91) (3.19) (1.03)
Political Constraints 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.020 -0.053*
(0.63) (0.69) (0.59) (0.60) (0.69) (1.65)
NATO -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.009
(0.28) (1.25) (0.27) (0.38) (0.53) (1.08)
Election 0.007
(0.88)
Election ∗ NATO1 0.010
(1.23)
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.026**
(3.19) (3.18) (3.00) (2.76)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(4.04) (4.03) (3.76) (4.12) (3.85)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005** -0.004
(2.03) (2.05) (1.98) (2.03) (2.21) (1.34)
∆ ln Unemployment -0.041**
(2.24)
∆ ln Dependency Ratio -0.332
(0.88)
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 460 460 460 460 460 334
Number of N 22 22 22 22 22 16
R2 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16
Dependent variable: ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: panel-corrected SE; Sample period: 1988-
2009
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.029***
(3.38) (3.27) (3.14) (2.71)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(2.96) (2.92) (2.84) (2.90) (2.91)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006*
(2.30) (2.28) (2.17) (2.18) (2.14) (1.61)
Dependent variable: ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’); Method: random-effects; Sample period: 1988-2009
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.016** -0.016** -0.015** -0.020**
(2.35) (2.39) (2.20) (2.17)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019***
(3.45) (3.44) (3.06) (3.49) (3.12)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.008** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.008** -0.009**
(2.43) (2.40) (2.40) (2.47) (2.52) (2.57)
See notes for Table 2. For brevity and comparability, the table displays the results of regressions with PCSE and
the regressions on ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’) only for the variables of interest.
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Table 3b: Political cycles in military-to-social expenditure ratio (continued)
Dependent variable: ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: fixed-effects; Sample period: 1988-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.027**
(3.35) (3.40) (3.14) (2.90)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.020***
(4.52) (4.50) (4.16) (4.69) (4.00)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.006* -0.006* -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.005
(2.07) (2.05) (2.01) (2.07) (1.98) (1.37)
Dependent variable: ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’); Method: fixed-effects; Sample period: 1988-2009
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.017** -0.017** -0.016** -0.021**
(2.48) (2.56) (2.31) (2.32)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.020***
(3.98) (3.98) (3.61) (4.12) (3.72)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.010**
(2.67) (2.64) (2.64) (2.70) (2.60) (2.60)
Dependent variable: ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: random-effects; including lagged dependent
variable; Sample period: 1988-2009
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.024**
(3.15) (3.15) (2.94) (2.53)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018***
(3.64) (3.62) (3.36) (3.83) (3.16)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.005** -0.005* -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.004
(2.02) (2.02) (1.96) (2.04) (2.20) (1.36)
Dependent variable: ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’); Method: random-effects; including lagged dependent
variable; Sample period: 1988-2009
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.015** -0.016** -0.014** -0.018**
(2.32) (2.36) (2.16) (2.02)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019***
(3.54) (3.54) (3.04) (3.60) (3.08)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.008** -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** -0.008** -0.009**
(2.38) (2.36) (2.37) (2.42) (2.51) (2.52)
See notes for Table 2. For brevity and comparability, the table displays the results only for the variables of interest.
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Table 4: Political cycles in military-to-social expenditure ratio: robustness tests
Dependent variable: ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: random-effects; Sample period: 1988-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln GDP per capita -0.050 -0.146 -0.043 0.002 0.012
(0.22) (0.58) (0.17) (0.01 (0.05)
∆ ln Globalization 0.001 0.001 0.04 0.001 0.001
(0.44) (0.08) (1.39) (0.42) (0.45)
∆ ln Armed Forces 0.022** 0.022** 0.034 0.022** 0.22** 0.022**
(2.06) (2.17) (1.29) (2.10) (2.12) (2.21)
∆ ln Rivals 0.163* 0.158 0.169* 0.174* 0.172* 0.174*
(1.90) (1.56) (1.91) (1.94) (1.96) (1.82)
Volunteers 0.004 0.015 0.006 0.001 0.002
(0.45) (1.55) (0.81) (0.13) (0.22)
Wars 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.012** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017***
(3.11) (2.99) (2.29) (2.92) (2.87) (3.55)
Political Constraints 0.014 -0.017 0.067* 0.018 0.017
(0.45) (0.41) (2.21) (0.60) (0.58)
NATO -0.004 -0.006 0.005 -0.002 -0.003
(0.57) (0.79) (0.75) (0.26) (0.44)
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.021***
(3.00) (3.66) (3.76) (3.48) (3.83) (3.57)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.017***
(3.80) (3.64) (3.54) (3.11) (3.80) (4.60)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.004* -0.004 -0.006** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004*
(1.71) (1.43) (2.30) (2.02) (1.99) (1.93)
∆ ln Unemployment -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.029* -0.041** -0.041** -0.043**
(2.96) (3.16) (1.80) (2.27) (2.21) (2.39)
∆ ln Dependency Ratio -0.292 -0.343 -0.625 -0.339 -0.312
(0.80) (0.95) (1.42) (0.89) (0.82)
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 439 376 334 460 460 460
Number of N 21 18 16 22 22 22
R2 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19
Dependent variable: ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘TSE’); Method: panel-corrected SE; Sample period: 1988-
2009
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.022*** -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.014***
(3.02) (3.08) (3.69) (3.22) (3.32) (2.30)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.018** -0.020** -0.024*** -0.022***
(2.79) (2.70) (2.11) (2.44) (2.82) (3.03)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.005** -0.005* -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.005*
(2.05) (1.80) (1.98) (2.15) (2.12) (1.77)
Dependent variable: ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’); Method: random-effects; Sample period: 1988-2009
Pre-Election ∗ NATO1 -0.016** -0.020*** -0.024*** -0.015** -0.017*** -0.016**
(2.21) (2.66) (3.29) (2.27) (2.82) (2.57)
Election ∗ NATO0 -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.012** -0.018** -0.022*** -0.019***
(2.99) (2.95) (2.17) (2.42) (3.05) (5.09)
Ideology (Left-Wing) -0.006** -0.009*** -0.009** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007**
(2.03) (2.69) (2.37) (2.48) (2.43) (2.41)
Equation in column (1) excludes the countries with presidential regime: the United States. Equation in column (2)
excludes the countries with majoritarian electoral system: Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United
States. Equation in column (3) excludes the six highest fiscally decentralised countries: Belgium, Canada, Finland,
Germany, Spain and Switzerland. Equation in column (4) controls for the timing of elections within the year.
Equation in column (5) assigns a smaller weight to non-predetermined elections. Equation in column (6) excludes
the statistically insignificant control variables. For brevity and comparability, the table displays the results of
regressions with PCSE and the regressions on ∆ ln (‘TME’/‘SSE’) only for the variables of interest.
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A Appendix
A.1 Further Insights on Partisan Cycles
In this section we provide additional insights on ideology regularities in social and
military spending by looking at four cases: Australia, Belgium, Spain and the United
States (US). A visual inspection of Figure A.1 reveals evidence of partisan cycles in the
allocation of public spending in Australia, where, from 1988 to 1996, Bob Hawke, leader
of the Labor Party, increased the share of social spending by more than 5 percentage
points, while on overage military spending was slightly reduced. We can then observe
a remarkable change in policies from 1997 to 2007, as a Liberal-National coalition won
the federal elections and interrupted the left-wing government’s sharp increase in social
spending. The growth in social spending was again restored in 2007, when the Labor
won the elections.
Belgium is an interesting case as it exhibits a clear-cut tradeoff between social and
military spending over the whole period. In most years, drops in social spending are
paralleled by increases in military spending and vice-versa. Moreover, from 1988 on we
can see signs of partisan cycles, with a marked increase in social spending and a parallel
decline in military spending, partly because of the end of the Cold War and the ensuing
partial disarmament across NATO countries. From 1999, as the ideology index moves
from 3 to 4, we can observe a noticeable growth in the level of social spending, which
reached an all-time high of almost 30% in 2009, and a continuous reduction in the level
of military spending.
Spain also provides support to the existence of partisan cycles in public spending.
When Felipe Gonza´lez Ma´rquez, General Secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers’
Party, came into power in 1982, he oversaw the establishment of a comprehensive welfare
state, including the improvement of a number of social programmes such as pensions and
unemployment benefits. Accordingly, social spending increased by almost 5 percentage
points between 1988 and 1993, the year of the elections, while military spending steadily
declined. When Jose´ Mar´ıa Aznar of the People’s party replaced the left-wing govern-
ment, he implemented a number of cuts to both social and military spending, while the
return of a leftist government, under Zapatero, brought the level of social spending back
to the 1993 levels. Military spending was left almost untouched, and slightly increased
after 2004, partially because of the Spanish involvement in Afghanistan.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the reduction in military spending
in the US was accompanied by an increase in social expenditure; notwithstanding the
presence of a conservative presidency (George H. W. Bush) there was a short term
tradeoff between defence and welfare spending. Under Bill Clinton’s presidency (1993-
2001) the military burden was severely reduced, and went from 5% to almost 3% of the
GDP. Social spending was on average much larger than in the previous administration,
but was reduced after the beginning of his second term, and then increased again
slightly before the elections in 2001. Under George W. Bush (2001-2009) there was a
quick recovery in the share of the budget devoted to the armed forces. Yet, the growth in
social spending continued unabated at the beginning of his first term, possibly because
of the inertia, then it was reduced toward his second term in office and increased again
before the elections in 2009. Finally, under Obama social spending was significantly
increased, in part due to worsening economic conditions after the 2008 crisis.
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Figure A.1: Single-country evidence of partisan cycles
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: Number of elections in the sample (1988-2009)
Country Elections Country Elections Country Elections
Australia 8 (10) Greece 8 (10) Portugal 7 (9)
Austria 7 (9) Ireland 6 (8) Spain 6 (8)
Belgium 6 (8) Italy 7 (8) Sweden 6 (8)
Canada 7 (8) Japan 7 (9) Switzerland 6 (7)
Denmark 8 (10) Luxembourg 5 (6) United Kingdom 5 (6)
Finland 6 (7) Netherlands 6 (9) United States 6 (7)
France 5 (7) New Zealand 8 (10)
Germany 7 (8) Norway 6 (8)
The number in parenthesis indicates the number of elections included in the full sample for social
expenditure (1981-2009).
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics and data sources (1988-2009)
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Source
Total Social Expenditure 482 21.7 4.9 10.7 35.7 SOCX
(% of GDP)
Subcomponents of Social 482 11.7 3.4 5.0 20.4 SOCX
Expenditure (% of GDP)
GDP per capita 484 23848.1 8941.6 7930.4 56389.2 WDI
Unemployment Rate 484 7.1 3.6 0.5 23.9 WDI
Globalization 484 77.1 12.6 36.0 98.9 Dreher (2006)a
(KOF economic subindex)
Dependency Ratio 484 49.7 3.3 43.1 65.2 WDI
Political Constraints 484 0.49 0.09 0.23 0.72 Henisz (2000)
(POLCON index)
Total Military Expenditure 484 1.9 0.9 0.5 5.8 SIPRI
(% of GDP)
Armed Forces (% of Labour) 484 1.2 0.8 0.1 5.2 SDM
Rivals 484 3133.4 17177.0 0 218402 Dunne et al. (2009)
Volunteers 484 0.25 0.43 0 1 Bove & Cavatorta
(2012)
Wars 484 0.15 0.35 0 1 COW
Election 484 0.27 0.45 0 1 Various Sources
Ideology (Left-Wing) 484 2.9 0.9 1 4 Potrafke (2009)
SOCX: OECD Social Expenditure Database; WDI: World Bank’s World Development Indicators; SIPRI: Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute; COW: Correlates of War Project; SDM: Swedish Defence Ministry;
a KOF Index of Globalization, Version 2013.
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Table A.3: Political cycles in social expenditure: robustness tests
Dependent variable: ∆ ln Total Social Expenditure (∆ lnTSE), ∆ ln Subcomponents of Social Expenditure (∆ lnSSE); Method: Bias-corrected LSDV; Sample
period: 1988-2009
∆ lnTSE ∆ lnSSE ∆ lnTSE ∆ lnSSE ∆ lnTSE ∆ lnSSE ∆ lnTSE ∆ lnSSE ∆ lnTSE ∆ lnSSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lagged Dependent 0.225*** 0.243*** 0.199*** 0.250*** 0.216*** 0.232*** 0.225*** 0.233*** 0.227*** 0.233***
(5.08) (5.13) (4.07) (4.85) (4.22) (4.29) (5.22) (5.12) (5.28) (5.12)
∆ ln GDP per capita -0.800*** -0.873*** -0.792*** -0.873*** -0.773*** -0.791*** -0.796*** -0.880*** -0.801*** -0.884***
(7.22) (6.73) (6.52) (6.19) (6.37) (5.38) (7.87) (7.41) (7.94) (7.45)
∆ ln Unemployment 0.031*** 0.006 0.031** 0.008 0.013 -0.003 0.030*** 0.007 0.030*** 0.007
(2.63) (0.46) (2.16) (0.47) (0.84) (0.17) (2.63) (0.49) (2.61) (0.48)
∆ ln Globalization -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.08*** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005***
(2.58) (2.89) (2.16) (2.44) (2.74) (3.34) (2.45) (2.74) (2.50) (2.76)
∆ ln Dependency Ratio 0.067 0.372 0.122 0.299 0.148 0.659* 0.066 0.312 0.054 0.303
(0.26) (1.24) (0.42) (0.88) (0.53) (1.91) (0.26) (1.04) (0.22) (1.02)
Political Constraints -0.013 0.006 0.002 0.005 -0.013 -0.005 -0.013 0.005 -0.012 0.005
(0.43) (0.17) (0.05) (0.10) (0.36) (0.11) (0.39) (0.13) (0.38) (0.14)
Election 0.009*** 0.007** 0.009** 0.007* 0.009*** 0.009** 0.008*** 0.006* 0.009*** 0.007*
(3.09) (2.06) (2.42) (1.70) (2.61) (2.12) (2.61) (1.82) (2.88) (1.92)
Ideology (Left-Wing) 0.002 0.006*** 0.003* 0.007*** 0.003 0.006*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 0.005***
(1.54) (3.12) (1.72) (3.17) (1.63) (2.67) (1.39) (2.88) (1.37) (2.87)
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 437 437 374 374 332 332 458 458 458 458
Number of N 21 21 18 18 16 16 22 22 22 22
See notes for Table 1. Equations in columns (1) and (2) exclude the countries with presidential regime: the United States. Equations in columns (3) and (4) exclude the countries with
majoritarian electoral system: Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Equations in columns (5) and (6) exclude the six highest fiscally decentralised countries:
Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Spain and Switzerland. Equations in columns (7) and (8) control for the timing of elections within the year. Equations in columns (9) and (10)
assign a smaller weight to non-predetermined elections.
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A.3 Theoretical Model: Proofs
A.3.1 Equation 7
In the election period, a bad politician chooses the level of military expenditure g1 = s
when:
UI(g1 = s/ωP = ωL) > U
I(g1 = g
∗∗(piI)/ωP = ωL) (A.i)
First, we get an expression for both components:
UI(g1 = s/ωP = ωL) =
ωL
(
f(s) −
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piI
)2)
+X+
β


ρ (s)
[
ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piI ))− 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piI
)2)
+X + l
(
piI
)
h(s− g∗∗(piI)) + n(s− g∗∗(piI ))
]
+
(1− ρ(s))


p
(
ωL
(
f(s)− 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piC
)2)
−
(
piI − piC
)2)
+
(1− p)
(
ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piC)) − 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piC
)2)
+ l
(
piC
)
h(s− g∗∗(piC)) −
(
piI − piC
)2)




UI(g1 = g
∗∗(piI )/ωP = ωL) =
ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piI ))−
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piI
)2)
+X + l
(
piI
)
h(s− g∗∗(piI )) + n(s− g∗∗(piI))+
β


ρ
(
g∗∗(piI)
) [
ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piI ))− 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piI
)2)
+X + l
(
piI
)
h(s− g∗∗(piI)) + n(s− g∗∗(piI ))
]
+
(
1− ρ(g∗∗(piI )
)


p
(
ωL
(
f(s) − 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piC
)2)
−
(
piI − piC
)2)
+
(1− p)
(
ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piC))− 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piC
)2)
+ l
(
piI
)
h(s− g∗∗(piC))−
(
piI − piC
)2)




Substituting the last couple of equations into (A.i) and rearranging terms we obtain:
ωL
(
f(s)− f(g∗∗(piI ))
)
− l
(
piI
)
h(s− g∗∗(piI)) − n(s− g∗∗(piI ))+
β
[
ρ(s)− ρ(g∗∗(piI ))
] [(
ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piI ))−
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piI
)2)
+X + l
(
piI
)
h(s− g∗∗(piI )) + n(s− g∗∗(piI))
)]
+
β
[
ρ(g∗∗(piI ))− ρ(s)
] 
(
ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piC)) − 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piC
)2)
−
((
piI − piC
)2))
+
p
(
ωL
[
f(s)− f(g∗∗(piC))
])
+ (1− p)l(piI))h(s − g∗∗(piC))

 > 0
Define ∆H(g∗∗(piI)) = ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piI))− f(s)
)
+ l
(
piI
)
h
(
s− g∗∗(piI)
)
. Using this ex-
pression and rearranging terms, the previous condition becomes:
β
[
ρ(s)− ρ(g∗∗(piI ))
] [(
ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piI ))−
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piI
)2)
+X + l
(
piI
)
h(s− g∗∗(piI )) + n(s− g∗∗(piI))
)]
+
β
[
ρ(g∗∗(piI ))− ρ(s)
] 
(
ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piC)) − 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piC
)2)
−
((
piI − piC
)2))
+
p
(
ωL
(
f(s) − f(g∗∗(piC))
))
+ (1 − p)l(piI )h(s− g∗∗(piC))


> ∆H(g∗∗(piI)) + n(s− g∗∗(piI ))
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Further rearrangement yields:
β
[
ρ(s)− ρ(g∗∗(piI ))
]


[(
ωL
(
f(g∗∗(piI)) − f(g∗∗(piC))
)
+
X + l
(
piI
) [(
h(s− g∗∗(piI ))− h(s− g∗∗(piC))
)]
+ n(s− g∗∗(piI ))
)]
+
p∆H(g∗∗(piC)) + 1
N
(
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piC
)2
−
N∑
i=1
(
pii − piI
)2)
+
(
piI − piC
)2


> ∆H(g∗∗(piI)) + n(s− g∗∗(piI ))
Finally, we obtain that:
∆H(g∗∗(piI )) + n(s− g∗∗(piI )) ≤
β
[
ρ(s) − ρ(g∗∗(piI))
] [
∆H(g∗∗(piI)) −∆H(g∗∗(piC))
]
+X + p∆H(g∗∗(piC)) + n(s− g∗∗(piI )) + ∆Π (A.ii)
A.3.2 Footnote 12
When the economy is in conflict, condition (A.i) becomes:
UI(g1 = g
∗/ω = ωL) > U
I(g1 = g
∗∗∗(piI )/ω = ωL) (A.iii)
Using (A.iii) and following the same procedure as above, we arrive at the following
condition:
∆H˜(g∗∗∗(piI )) + n(s− g∗∗∗(piI)) − n(s− g∗) ≤ (A.iv)
β
[
ρ(g∗)− ρ(g∗∗∗(piI)
] [
∆H˜(g∗∗∗(piI ))−∆H˜(g∗∗∗(piC))
]
+X + p∆H˜(g∗∗∗(piC)) + n(s− g∗∗∗(piI )) + ∆Π (A.v)
where
∆H˜(g∗∗∗(piI )) = ωL

f(g∗∗∗(piI ))− f(g∗) + b(s− g∗∗∗(piI ))− b(s− g∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
voters’ utility change

+ l (piI) [h(s− g∗∗∗(piI ))− h (s− g∗)]
(A.vi)
Compared to the case of a peaceful economy there are two main differences. First,
the most preferred level of military expenditure for the politician changes to g∗∗∗(piI).
Second, the definition includes other elements since: (i) voters assign now positive
value to military expenditure and the change in their utility is part of the politician’s
opportunity cost; and (ii) the positive level of military expenditure in the election period
affects the utility of politicians (reflected in the last element in (A.vi)). Finally, note
that the loss in “status” to the incumbent politician when playing g∗ instead of g∗∗∗(piI)
is different from that when playing s instead of g∗∗(piI).
A.3.3 Equation 10
The Bayes’ theorem states that:
Pr(ωP = ωH/g1 = s) =
Pr(g1 = s/ωP = ωH) Pr (ωP = ωH)
Pr(g1 = s)
Notice that: (i) Pr(g1 = s/ωP = ωH) = 1, since a good politician always follows that
strategy; (ii) Pr (ωP = ωH) = p is an assumption in the model; and, (iii) Pr (g1 = s) =
p+(1− p) q, since a proportion p of politicians are “good” and thus always play s, while
a proportion (1− p) of politicians are “bad” and thus play g1 = s with probability q.
Substituting these three probabilities into the previous condition the result follows.
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A.3.4 Equilibria when the economy is in conflict
We can make a distinction between three cases depending on whether the following
condition holds:
∆H˜(g∗∗∗(piI )) + n(s− g∗∗∗(piI)) − n(s− g∗) ≤
β
[
∆H˜(g∗∗∗(piI ))−∆H˜(g∗∗∗(piC))
]
+X + p∆H˜(g∗∗∗(piC)) + n(s− g∗∗∗(piI )) + ∆Π (A.vii)
Case 1: If condition (A.vii) holds with strict inequality, the incumbent will choose
to play g1 = g
∗ with probability 1, and the swing voters will set p(g1 = g
∗) = p and
zero otherwise. Hence, the swing voters will vote for the incumbent with probability
r > 1/2−φ
I
φM
and the incumbent will get re-elected with probability 1 provided that he
plays g1 = g
∗. In this case we have a pooling equilibrium since both good and bad
politicians are playing the same set of strategies.
Case 2: If condition (A.vii) holds with strict equality, the incumbent will choose to
play g1 = g
∗ with probability q, the swing voters will set p1(g1 = g
∗) > p and zero
otherwise. The incumbent will thus get re-elected with probability 1 provided that he
plays g1 = g
∗. In this case we have a mixed equilibrium.
Case 3: If condition (A.vii) does not hold (LHS of (A.vii)>RHS of (A.vii)), the
incumbent will choose to play g∗∗∗(piI), and the swing voters will set p(g1 = g
∗) = 1 and
zero otherwise. Hence, the swing voters will vote for the challenger with probability
1, resulting in the incumbent losing the elections. In this case we have a separating
equilibrium since good and bad politicians are playing different strategies in the election
period.
